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ABSTRACT 
Information asymmetry creates a gap between management’s perception of the firm’s value 
and the market value of the firm. It is thought that management engage in information 
signalling activities in order to close the gap created by information asymmetry.  
There is a need to understand why management engage in their chosen transactions as this 
will provide investors with insight into market activities, as well as allow for more accurate 
investment strategies. While research is available on the market’s reactions to signalling 
events, the problem is whether management’s intentions have been correctly interpreted by 
the market. The starting point to gaining this understanding is to ask the question: What 
signals do management send when they issue and repurchase shares? 
This study attempts to answer this question by investigating whether companies listed on the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE) issue shares because management perceive their market 
values to be overvalued and repurchase shares because their market values are undervalued. 
For the period 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2012, a total of 295 share issue 
announcements are considered for 102 companies; and a total of 183 share repurchase 
announcements are considered for 83 companies. 
 
The results of this study reveal that managerial equity market timing may exist in the 
presence of excess returns, where management are better able to predict returns in advance 
than the market. However, there is also evidence suggesting share repurchases are made to 
return excess cash to shareholders and issues and repurchases decisions are linked to capital 
structure planning. The fact that there are other potential reasons for share issues and 
repurchases, means that the market must be able to determine what the real intentions of 
management are when shares are issued and repurchased; and hence determine whether their 
intentions suggest equity market mispricing.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to understand one of the dimensions of corporate strategy, 
namely equity market timing, specifically on the JSE. The study will ascertain whether 
companies listed on the JSE issue shares because management perceive their market values to 
be overvalued and repurchase shares because their market values are undervalued. 
 
1.2 Context of the study 
It is widely accepted that theory of finance concepts are based on the assumption that the 
main objective of companies is to maximise shareholder value (BPP Learning Media, 2007). 
Part of maximising shareholder value entails obtaining the lowest possible cost of capital so 
as to maximise returns earned in excess of the cost of funding. Since the cost of capital is 
largely influenced by the capital structure of companies, debt and equity is relevant to 
persons interested in investigating the maximisation of shareholder wealth. In South Africa, 
companies were unable to manage the equity component of their capital structures through 
share buybacks prior to July 1999 (Crotty, 2013). South Africa’s share repurchase activity is 
thus limited to less than fifteen years, which means that research on share repurchases in the 
country is also limited to less than fifteen years. Since the management of equity entails both 
equity issues and repurchases, this study investigates both of these scenarios. 
 
There are numerous reasons for entities to actively manage their equity, some of which 
include the need to enhance financial flexibility, to maintain a target capital structure, avoid a 
hostile takeover or to send certain signals to the market. ‘Equity market timing in corporate 
finance refers to the issuing of shares when share prices are high and repurchasing shares 
when share prices are low, in an attempt to benefit from temporary movements in the cost of 
equity’ (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). While this research attempts to control for the possible 
reasons for managing equity, the focus of this study is on whether management takes 
advantage of equity market mispricing by issuing or repurchasing shares. 
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1.3 Problem statement 
1.3.1 Main Problem 
The purpose of the research is to ascertain whether companies listed on the JSE attempt to 
engage in equity market timing by issuing shares because management perceive their market 
values to be overvalued and repurchasing shares because their market values are undervalued. 
 
1.3.2 Sub-problems 
The first sub-problem is to ascertain whether companies listed on the JSE issue shares 
because management perceive their market values to be overvalued. 
The second sub-problem is to ascertain whether companies listed on the JSE repurchase 
shares because management perceive their market values to be undervalued. 
 
1.4 Significance of the study 
Since share buy-backs have only been allowed in South Africa since 30 June 1999 (Republic 
of South Africa, 1999), this study fills a gap by providing up-to-date information about share 
repurchases. Prior to 2007, there were no databases containing details of share buybacks of 
companies listed on the JSE; while many such databases were in existence for countries that 
have a longer history of share buybacks (de Goede, 2007). In addition, South Africa’s limited 
history of share buybacks translates into a need for any analysis that relate to these types of 
transactions. This study provides additional insight into how listed companies attempt to 
manage their equity to create shareholder value in South Africa. The results of this study will 
assist the market to more accurately interpret management’s actions and this will increase 
market efficiency and reduce information asymmetry between the market and management. 
The results can be used as a basis for future research to determine how equity issues and 
repurchases affect capital structure in the long run. Furthermore, the results of this study not 
only provides the market with further insight into managerial behaviour, but investors will be 
in a better position to plan their investment strategies and possibly benefit from excess returns 
due to a better understanding of the dynamics behind share issues (repurchases). 
 
1.5 Delimitations of the study 
This study only focuses on equity market timing as part of corporate strategy. Details 
regarding reasons for debt issues have not been directly investigated. This study does also not 
investigate the impact of equity market timing on capital structure. Furthermore, while this 
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study attempts to ascertain if share issues (repurchases) have occurred because of mispricing, 
it does not attempt to investigate management’s behaviour at times when no share issues 
(repurchases) are announced. For the purposes of this study, initial public offerings (IPOs) 
and stock splits do not constitute share issues. 
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2. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
Assets - total assets as per the Statement of Financial Position 
Capital - total debt plus equity as per the Statement of Financial Position 
Capital asset pricing model (CAPM) - calculated as the risk free rate plus beta multiplied 
by the equity risk premium 
Equity market timing - ‘the issuing of shares when share prices are overvalued and 
repurchasing shares when share prices are undervalued, in an attempt to benefit from 
temporary movements in the cost of equity’ (Baker & Wurgler, 2002) 
Excess return - calculated as the difference between actual return in a future period and 
required return on announcement date  
Managerial equity market timing - used interchangeably with the term ‘equity market 
timing’ in corporate finance 
Market-to-book (MTB) value of shares – calculated as market price per share divided by 
the net asset value per share; where the net asset value equals total assets less total liabilities 
Mispricing metric – any metric used to ascertain the over or undervaluation of shares 
Price earnings ratio (PE) - refers to historical / trailing PE ratio. The market accepts the 
calculation as market price per share divided by the latest historical earnings per share  
Price earnings to growth ratio (PEG) - refers to historical / trailing PEG ratio. Calculated 
as PE ratio divided by the latest annual 3 year earnings per share growth 
Share buy-back - used interchangeably with the term ‘share repurchase’ 
Share repurchase - refers to the actions taken by management to repurchase ordinary equity 
from existing shareholders. Shares can be repurchased by way of a tender offer, purchase in 
the open market or by way of a private purchase (Vermaelen, 1981) 
Share issue - refers to the actions taken by management to issue new equity in the market. 
For the purpose of this research, share issues constitute the issue of ordinary share capital 
Total debt - amounts (both long and short term) owing to creditors. This does not include 
accounting adjustments such as accruals and deferred tax. Identified as per the Statement of 
Financial Position 
Total Equity - total equity as per the Statement of Financial Position 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This section contains the review of related literature. Firstly, shareholder value creation will 
be linked to the significance of equity in capital structure. Thereafter, market signalling and 
information asymmetry will be explained, followed by a review of managerial equity market 
timing. Lastly, a brief explanation will be provided for various other potential reasons for 
share issues and repurchases. The themes that have surfaced from the review of related 
literature will form the backdrop of all analysis that is conducted in this study. 
 
3.2 Equity in capital structure and shareholder value creation 
It is widely accepted that theory of finance concepts are based on the assumption that the 
main objective of companies is to maximise shareholder value (BPP Learning Media, 2007). 
With the globalisation of capital markets, increased corporate governance which has led to 
shareholders demanding accountability from management as well as management’s concern 
with self-preservation, the need to create shareholder value has become increasingly topical 
(Institutue of Management Accountants, 1997). The Institute of Management Accountants 
(1997) identify two examples of shareholder value-creation strategies, namely, the increase of 
cash flow from operations as well as the reduction of the capital charge. Some could argue 
that the latter is concerned with obtaining an optimal capital structure in which the cost of 
capital is minimised. According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), firms would not derive 
material cost benefits from switching between debt and equity since the cost of different 
forms of capital do not vary significantly in efficient and integrated capital markets. Although 
this research has formed the foundation of finance theory studied in today’s world, the era in 
which it was undertaken is significantly different to today’s era of capital markets. Differing 
tax rates for different forms of capital, credit rating requirements and capital market 
regulations are among the factors that have changed since 1958. Furthermore, in the United 
States (US), management’s actions have contradicted Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) theory 
of the irrelevancy of debt and equity, when they admitted that they are reluctant to issue 
common equity when they feel their market values are high (Graham & Harvey, 2002). 
 
Tasked with maximising shareholder value, it is up to management to ensure that the cost of 
funding is minimised. Historically, South African regulation has restricted the management 
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of equity. Firstly, share repurchases were disallowed until the Companies Amendment Act 37 
of 1999 was implemented. Secondly, companies were required to have a minimum amount of 
issued share capital so that creditors could assess whether shareholders have assumed 
adequate risk associated with the company (Makapela, 2010). The latter capital maintenance 
rule has however been replaced with rules based on solvency and liquidity in order to protect 
creditors under the new Companies Act No 71 of 2008 (Republic of South Africa, 2008). 
With the restrictions on share repurchases and capital maintenance rules lifted, management 
have been allowed more freedom to manage the equity component of their capital structures. 
Management therefore have no excuse to ignore the equity component of capital structure in 
their task to maximise shareholder value through minimising the cost of funding. 
 
Two of the more prominent theories concerning the raising of capital are the so-called 
‘pecking order theory’ and ‘trade-off theory’. Under the pecking-order theory, firms are said 
to first utilise internally generated funds to pursue value-creating investments, followed by 
new debt and then lastly would resort to issuing new equity as a source of finance (Kaplan 
Schweser, 2012). Under the static trade-off theory, firms are said to balance the benefits of 
debt with the costs of financial distress (Kaplan Schweser, 2012). Once an optimal debt level 
is reached, further changes to the capital structure can only be achieved by altering the level 
of equity. In a survey conducted by Graham and Harvey (2002), moderate support was found 
for the application of the trade-off theory in Fortune 500 firms. This suggests that managers 
believe that value can be created for shareholders by working toward some type of optimal 
debt equity mix. It should however be noted that Graham and Harvey’s (2002) survey of 
Fortune 500 firms is limited to the number of respondents (392 chief financial officers 
(CFOs) responded, which represented a mere response rate of 9%). Not only is there a risk 
that the respondents’ views do not represent the views of the entire population, but there is 
also no certainty that South African CFOs think in the same manner as those Fortune 500 
CFOs. It has however been found that South African firms follow a pecking order theory 
(Mohohlo, 2013), which is consistent with the strong statistical evidence found by Shyam-
Sunder and Myers (1999), that the pecking order theory is the preferred method of corporate 
financing behaviour among mature industrial Compustat firms. 
 
If South African firms behave according to the pecking order theory, the need to manage 
equity would be limited and possibly even non-existent. Shareholder value would be created 
by the optimal utilisation of internally generated funds and the cost of capital focus would be 
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primarily on the cost of debt. If however, the trade-off theory is more prominent among 
South African firms, firms will look to optimise their capital structure and corporate actions 
such as equity issues and repurchases would be prominent in the market.  
 
In inefficient capital markets, managers have the opportunity to create value for on-going 
shareholders at the expense of new and exiting shareholders (Baker & Wurgler, 2002). This 
finding is re-iterated by Babenko, Tserlukevich & Wan (2012) who found that share issues 
usually lead to share price declines. The authors firstly conclude that incoming and exiting 
shareholders are worse off due to managerial equity market timing. Furthermore, current 
shareholder wealth is maximised when managers time the market with share repurchases; and 
lastly, future shareholders’ wealth is maximised when managers time the market with equity 
issuances.   
 
Baker and Wurgler (2002) state that “capital structure evolves as the cumulative outcome of 
past attempts to time the equity market”. In other words, equity market timing leads to capital 
structure decisions, instead of the traditional notions that capital structure policies lead to 
equity market timing. 
 
3.3 Signalling and information asymmetry 
Agency theory suggests that managers act as agents to perform functions on behalf of 
shareholders, who are the principals; and an agency problem exists when the agents do not 
act in the best interests of the principals (Kaplan Schweser, 2012). Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) suggest that the agency problem ultimately results in agency costs that are dependent 
on factors such as regulation and the sophistication of contracts between the various 
stakeholders of the firm. 
 
The issuing of managerial stock options is one method that can be used to counteract the 
agency problem (Ramorwa, 2011). The presumption is that if managers are granted shares in 
the respective company, their actions which are driven by self-interest, would automatically 
result in them acting in the best interest of the shareholders, since they are both equity 
holders. It has however been proven, that this is not the case (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Although the manager with stock options will seek to maximise his own utility, the smaller 
the manager’s ownership claim, the smaller the incentive to seek innovative ventures that 
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would maximise shareholder value since the reward of pursuing such ventures may not 
necessarily outweigh the effort of doing so (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Ultimately, managers 
have information that outside shareholders do not have. This information gap is often referred 
to as ‘information asymmetry’. Unless management explicitly communicate this information 
to the shareholders, shareholders have no choice but to infer the knowledge from managers’ 
behaviour. 
 
The ‘signalling theory’ refers to the phenomenon whereby users look to management’s 
decisions and actions as signals about the state of the firm (Correia, Flynn, Uliana, & 
Wormald, 2003). When companies repurchase shares, the signal could either be interpreted in 
a negative way (as the implication could be that management cannot find a better use for the 
funds due to a lack of growth opportunities), or the signal could be positive especially if 
shares are being repurchased at a premium (as the implication could be that management 
believe the company is undervalued) (Vermaelen, 1981). Other signals that are linked to 
share repurchases include the notion that management are confident about the company’s 
ability to generate future cash inflows through earnings and therefore they are willing to 
commit to an outflow of funds through the share repurchase (Miller & Rock, 1985). If it is 
found that South African managers purchase shares when the share price is low and issue 
shares when the share price is high, then the market will know that share issues (repurchases) 
imply that management believe that the company’s shares are overvalued (undervalued). 
 
Due to information asymmetry and the resulting need for signalling, it follows that the issue 
or repurchase of equity could simply be an attempt by management to send a signal, whether 
truthful or not, to the market. On the other hand, management could simply be acting on the 
information unknown to the market, in which case management’s actions would still carry 
some sort of signal. It therefore follows that the signalling effect of equity decisions is 
inevitable, as long as there is a separation of ownership and control and an information gap 
exists between the owners and managers. This is confirmed by the empirical finding that 
‘firms engage in signalling activities’ (Vermaelen, 1981) but is rejected in a study conducted 
by Butler, Cornaggia, Grullon & Weston (2011), whereby they found no evidence that firms 
mislead investors through market timing. Babenko et al. (2012) confirms that CEOs are 
rewarded for share repurchases that have been successfully timed although no reward is 
provided for successfully timed share issues. Babenko et al.’s (2012) finding implies that a 
strong incentive exists for managers to signal to the market through share repurchases. 
17 
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Between the period October 2000 – March 2003, managers used share repurchases to signal 
to investors that they believed the company’s shares were undervalued, thus providing 
support for the signalling theory in the context of share repurchases on the JSE (Bhana, 
2007). There are however relevant limitations to this study that will be discussed later in this 
paper. 
 
Chang, Dasgupta & Hilary (2006) found that the greater the information asymmetry, the 
more likely it is that the firm has been incorrectly valued by the market. The firm will 
therefore make fewer equity issues, because if managers want to avoid issuing at a discount 
they will have to wait for the undervaluation to disappear; but then on the other hand they 
will have to issue equity to correct the mispricing and they will also have to issue equity in 
larger quantities (because opportunities to issue in future are limited). The authors used the 
number of analysts covering the respective firms as a measure of the degree of information 
asymmetry, and found that the lower the level of information asymmetry, the more likely it 
was that firms issued equity instead of debt. 
 
If the signalling theory holds, and managers can use equity issues and repurchases as an 
opportunity to send signals to the market, they could be tempted to run up the share price at 
the expense of maximising exiting shareholders’ value (Miller & Rock, 1985). 
 
3.4 Managerial equity market timing 
It has been found that the primary reason for share repurchases by US companies is to correct 
the mispricing of companies’ stock (Chan, Ikenberry, & Lee, 2004). From this it can be 
inferred that if companies look towards share repurchases to correct mispricing, then surely 
share issues are also possibly considered to achieve the same goal.  
 
By analysing US firms during the period 1968-1990, Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) 
identified periods during which equity capital can be raised at favourable terms. The authors 
found that during periods of large volumes of equity issuance announcements, the market 
prices the equity lower than during periods of low volumes of equity issuance 
announcements. It therefore follows that windows of opportunities exist for equity issues, 
which makes the timing of equity issues very important (Bayless & Chaplinsky, 1996). 
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Baker and Wurgler (2002) found evidence for market timing in four different kinds of 
studies. Firstly, actual historical past financing decisions of firms show that when the market 
value is high, relative to the book value and past market values, firms tend to issue equity 
instead of debt. On the other hand, when the market value is low, relative to the book value 
and past market values, firms tend to repurchase equity. Secondly, by analysing the long-run 
stock returns that follow corporate financing decisions, it is suggested that equity market 
timing is successful.  Thirdly, firms tend to issue equity when investors are too enthusiastic 
about earnings prospects and lastly, in a survey conducted by Graham and Harvey (2002), 
two thirds of CFOs admit that their perception of whether the stock is over or undervalued is 
an important consideration in their decision to issue equity. 
 
In a study conducted by Hovakimian (2006) it was found that while equity transactions may 
be due to equity market timing, the effects on capital structure are not long-lasting, as 
indicated by Baker and Wurgler (2002). Hovakimian (2006) found strong evidence that 
equity market timing exists for equity issues, but the evidence for equity market timing in 
share repurchases is weaker. Similar to the study conducted by Baker and Wurgler (2002), 
Hovakimian (2006) only considered MTB values when investigating the over or 
undervaluation of shares and the conclusion that equity issues occur when shares are 
overvalued is based on the fact that the MTB values of  the shares are high at the time of 
issue. 
 
Share repurchases could act as a substitute for dividends and could be a less risky form of 
returning cash to shareholders, since it does not constitute an obligation towards shareholders. 
In a South African context, it has been found that share repurchases are not financed by a 
reduction in dividends (Ramorwa, 2011). Because the author has identified share repurchases 
by analysing the actual number of shares outstanding at the end of each calendar year, the 
results of the study may be compromised because during the calendar years where share 
issues and repurchases occurred, the repurchases could be understated or not considered at 
all. That said, the finding of this study implies that South African firms are not substituting 
dividends with share repurchases, and instead their reason for share buy-backs must be linked 
to something else. It follows that with one of the most popular academically taught reasons 
for share repurchases now potentially having been eliminated in the South African market, 
the possible argument for equity market timing is thus much stronger in South Africa. 
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In a study conducted by Bhana (2007), it was found that market timing exists for South 
African companies engaging in share repurchases. The author found that companies 
repurchase shares when the shares are undervalued and determined whether shares are 
undervalued by investigating abnormal returns. The South African market reported abnormal 
returns of 4,38% at the time of announcement and 14,35% three years thereafter (Bhana, 
2007). The limitation of this study was that the sample size was limited to 117 companies, 
mainly due to the limited period that was used (October 2000 – March 2003) in the study 
(Bhana, 2007). Despite these limitations, Bhana’s (2007) study has provided a foundation off 
which to build equity market timing research in South Africa. 
 
3.5 Other possible reasons for equity issues and repurchases 
There are numerous potential reasons for entities to issue or repurchase equity, some of 
which include the need to exploit potential tax benefits linked to the equity transactions, to 
avoid a hostile takeover or to send certain signals to the market (Bhana, 2007; BPP Learning 
Media, 2007; Correia, et al., 2003; Graham & Harvey, 2002). Firms may also manage their 
equity in order to enhance financial flexibility or maintain a target capital structure (Correia, 
et al., 2003; Graham & Harvey, 2002). Reasons for share repurchases are often noted in 
academic literature as the decision to return excess cash to shareholders (Bhana, 2007; BPP 
Learning Media, 2007) or to substitute cash dividends with share repurchases; while share 
issues may be used to raise finance for new projects (Correia, et al., 2003). Finally, it has also 
been found that directors repurchase shares when earnings per share (EPS) is diluted due to 
outstanding employee stock options (Bens, Nagar, Skinner, & Wong, 2003).  
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4. RESEARCH DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This section outlines the method that was used to ascertain whether share issues (repurchases) 
are linked to managerial equity market timing. A quantitative approach has been followed to 
conduct the research. First, the sample and data collection will be discussed. Next, the 
research methodology will be discussed specifically focusing on the justification of the use of 
historical averages, the determination of the mispricing metrics, analysis of the mispricing 
metrics, the determination of the control variables and analysis of the control variables. 
Lastly, the research hypothesis will be presented, followed by the methodology, robustness, 
internal validity and reliability of the regression analysis. 
 
4.2 Sample and data collection 
4.2.1 Sample 
This study considers companies listed on the Main Board of the JSE. The purpose of 
selecting companies listed on the Main Board of the JSE is so that the research is applicable 
to shares that are publically traded. Even though shares listed on the Alternative Exchange 
(AltX) (South Africa’s junior board that lists smaller growing firms) are also publically 
traded, this index was only launched in 2003 (Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 2013), thus 
providing a limited history of the metrics required for the purposes of this study. 
Furthermore, the fact that the Main Board has three times as many shareholders as the AltX 
(Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 2013), means that the shares traded on the Main Board are 
more liquid. 
 
Only companies that have made share issues (repurchases) announcements are considered in 
this study. It should be noted that announcements are considered, irrespective of whether 
management actually issued or repurchased shares subsequent to the announcement. The 
reason for considering announcements and not the actual event/action of issuing 
(repurchasing) shares, is that management’s intentions (which would already have existed at 
the time of the announcements) are what is being considered in this study. Share issue and 
repurchase announcements were obtained from Corporate Actions available in the McGregor 
BFA database. The 2003 year was used as the starting period for the study, as information 
from this period was readily and accurately available on McGregor BFA. The cut-off date for 
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announcements considered in this study was 31 December 2012. This cut-off date ensures 
that the data used is up-to-date while still allowing for the use of the 2013 calendar year’s 
data when calculating excess returns. 
 
Where the study relies on information from the annual financial statements, the last published 
annual or interim financial statements were taken as the information on announcement date. 
For events to be included in the sample there must have been a minimum of three years’ 
financial information available from the announcement date. This three year period is 
necessary to calculate historical averages for the chosen metrics. The requirement for three 
years’ historical financial information also ensures that IPOs are excluded from this study. 
The inclusion of IPOs might distort the results of the study, since it is known and accepted in 
industry that the key reasons for IPOs is an exit strategy for pioneer investors or for the 
company to have greater access to funds. 
 
If there was a change in the reporting currency of the affected companies within the three 
years preceding the latest set of available information, the affected events are ignored. The 
reason for ignoring these events is that it would result in inconsistent variable results when 
calculating the necessary historical averages. A total of three announcements are excluded 
from this study based on the fact that there was a change in the reporting currency of the 
company within the affected periods. 
 
If companies have delisted within twelve months after the announcement date, the said 
announcements are ignored, since this research relies on calculating excess returns using 
actual returns twelve months after announcement date. It should be noted that only the 
affected events are ignored, and not all the events of the affected company. Furthermore, it 
has been observed that certain companies did not submit information to McGregor BFA if 
they were pending delisting (or for any other reason). Announcements affected by this 
incomplete information are also excluded from this research, as the reliability of the research 
results is dependent on complete and consistent information. 
 
This study further excludes stock split announcements since stock splits do not alter reserves 
(BPP Learning Media, 2007) and thus provide no opportunity for management to repurchase 
or issue additional shares at the time of the stock split. 
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Companies whose information is not available on McGregor BFA due to participation in 
merger activities during the period under review, are also excluded from the sample (based 
on this criteria a total of two companies, and thus all announcements of these companies, 
have been excluded from this study). 
 
The financial services sector are excluded from this study, since their capital structure is 
largely dictated by regulation (Mohohlo, 2013) and this could influence managements’ 
decisions surrounding the issue or repurchase of equity. To illustrate this, assume a scenario 
in which a bank needs to raise finance and would ideally like to do so by issuing debt. 
However, by applying Basel regulations which require a minimum level of equity in the 
capital structure (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006), the bank is unable to 
issue further debt and would have to issue equity to raise the required finance. It is therefore 
arguable that the dynamics surrounding equity issues and repurchases in the financial services 
sector is too different from other sectors to apply the same research tests. The exclusion of 
the financial sector also follows from prior related research (Baker & Wurgler, 2002; Chang, 
et al., 2006; Fraser & Page, 1999; Hovakimian, 2006; Mohohlo, 2013). 
 
Since the events included in the sample are chosen for a specific reason, this study can be 
seen to make use of a purposive sample (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010). This study might however 
be subject to slight survivorship bias due to the requirement that a company is listed for at 
least twelve months after the announcement date.  
 
After applying the above exclusions, a total of 295 share issue announcements are considered 
for 102 companies; and a total of 183 share repurchase announcements are considered for 83 
companies. A total of 145 companies are included in this study, with a total of 478 
announcements. A summary of the sample is presented in Table 1 of Appendix A. 
 
4.2.2 Data collection 
The main data source utilised for this study was the McGregor BFA database which contains 
publically available financial and statutory information of all companies listed on the Main 
Board of the JSE. Data was exported and managed with Microsoft Excel. The statistical tool 
STATA was used to perform statistical tests.  
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Upon selection of the sample announcements, a check was performed to establish whether the 
latest set of publically available information related to year-end or interim results. Because 
this study relies on historical averages, it is critical that there is consistency when calculating 
these averages. Due to discrepancies between the manner in which year-end and interim 
information is presented and summarised on McGregor BFA, it is necessary to make use of 
either an entire set of annual or an entire set of interim information, for all required years, 
when studying an event (i.e. one event cannot be studied by using a mixture of annual and 
interim information). For this reason, it was necessary to utilise year-end information in the 
following cases, when the latest set of publically available information was in fact interim 
results: 
• Any announcements that required interim information for the period prior to 2009, 
since the interim information required for this study was incomplete prior to 2006 on 
McGregor BFA 
• Where required interim information was incomplete for any year in the three years 
preceding the latest set of available information and that information could not be 
sourced elsewhere within McGregor BFA 
It should be noted that throughout this study, when referring to all financial statement 
information on announcement date, that the reference is to the latest set of publically 
available information prior to the announcement. 
 
4.3 Research methodology 
This study makes use of a quantitative method which involves the robust application of probit 
regression analysis. 
 
4.3.1 Historical averages 
The study attempts to determine whether financial information deviated from historical 
averages on the announcement dates/dates closest to the announcement dates. The three year 
historical average of the relevant metrics were used to assess the possible mispricing of 
shares and reasons for share issues (repurchases) announcements, other than equity market 
timing. The use of a three year period is consistent with prior research (Hovakimian, 2006) 
and relevant for this study since the period under review includes the 21st century global 
economic recession. The South African economy is said to have been in recession since the 
fourth quarter of 2008 until the third quarter of 2009 (Ruch, 2013; Theunissen, 2009). 
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The financial crisis significantly altered capital structure for the period 2006 – 2008, but these 
effects were almost completely reversed by the end of 2010 (Fosberg, 2012). This renders a 
five year period for the study of historical averages too long (since the five year averages may 
be distorted to correct the effects of the financial crisis towards the end of the five year 
period). A one or two year period was not used to analyse historical averages as it is arguable 
whether a one or two year period is long enough for firms to establish a metric that represents 
a general average. A three year period was thus deemed appropriate for this study. 
 
When calculating PE and PEG ratios, trailing (as opposed to forward) ratios have been used, 
since historical figures are known with certainty. In order to use forward ratios, earnings and 
growth estimates would have to be made for the future at the point of the share issue 
(repurchase) announcement; which requires the researcher to have all relevant knowledge of 
market conditions at each point of share issue (repurchase) in history. The use of forward PE 
and PEG ratios would thus rely on subjective estimations which would compromise the 
accuracy of the information. 
 
4.3.2 Determining the mispricing metrics 
The use of the following metrics assist in determining whether shares are under or 
overvalued: MTB value of shares, trailing PE, excess returns as determined by the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) and trailing PEG. These measures (with the exception of excess 
returns) have been identified, both directly and indirectly, by Brandes (2004) as value-
creating measures. The use of value creating measures is justified since value strategies could 
have been used to earn superior returns one month into the future for JSE listed industrial 
firms, during the period January 1973 and October 1997 (Fraser & Page, 1999). The use of 
excess returns is justified since it is industry practice, seen both in academic textbooks and 
published journal articles, to value shares using excess returns. (Bhana, 2007; BPP Learning 
Media, 2007) 
 
Table 2 depicts the definition of each of the mispricing metrics. When calculating the metrics, 
the latest set of publically available information prior to the issue (repurchase) 
announcement, was used. 
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Table 2: Definition of mispricing metrics 
Metric Definition 
MTB Average monthly close market price per share / NAV per share 
PE Share price / EPS(t) 
PEG PE / 3 year annual EPS growth 
Excess return  Re(t+1) – Ke(t) 
Ke (required return) Ke calculated by using CAPM 
Risk free rate + beta(equity risk premium) 
Re [Share price (t+1) – share price (t)] / share price(t) 
          *t equals the year of the share issue (repurchase) announcement 
 
4.3.2.1 Market-to-book values 
The MTB value of shares was used in numerous studies that attempted to investigate market 
timing (Baker & Wurgler, 2002; Butler, et al., 2011; Hovakimian, 2006) and has thus been 
adopted to detect mispricing. The market values were obtained from McGregor BFA’s 
monthly price data. The monthly average close prices were used (instead of the close price on 
the day of the announcement), since it was evident that the declaration dates for the share 
issue (repurchase) announcements stated in McGregor BFA, are sometimes a few days later 
than the actual announcement to the market by way of news articles. The result is that the 
exact announcement dates are not known with 100% certainty and therefore the next best 
price data (i.e. average monthly) was utilised. 
 
NAV per share was calculated as follows: 
(Total assets – total liabilities) / number of issued shares 
 
The number of issued shares were obtained from the financial statements. When using year-
end financial statements, the number of issued ordinary shares were used, whereas the interim 
financial statements only provided weighted average issued shares (for lack of more detailed 
information, this number was used as the issued shares for interim financial statement 
information). The fact that the number of shares used differs when using year-end and interim 
information, does not compromise the results of this study, since each event is analysed using 
a consistent set of information in all cases (i.e. if year-end information is used then all 
information relating to the affected event would make use of year-end figures and the same 
applies for the use of published interim information). 
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4.3.2.2 Price earnings ratio 
The use of the trailing PE ratio as a measure to assess the intrinsic value of shares is based on 
the fact that Graham and Harvey’s (2002) survey revealed that nearly 70% of CFOs identified 
EPS dilution as an important or very important factor in their decision to issue equity. It is 
therefore important to relate earnings (which is highly valued by managers) to the market 
price of shares (which is set by investors). 
 
The PE ratios were obtained from McGregor BFA’s monthly price data. The research report 
used average monthly price data (rather than actual data on the announcement date) for the 
same reasons depicted in 4.3.2.1. 
 
4.3.2.3 PEG ratio 
By investigating the trailing PEG ratio, this study sought to ensure that the trade-off between 
the share price, EPS and company growth is not ignored in the quest to determine the over 
and undervaluation of shares (Stocktrade, 2013). Due to the factor analysis explained in 5.1.2, 
this variable has however been removed from this study as a mispricing metric but remains as 
an input to one of the control variables (avoidance of a hostile takeover). 
 
The PE ratios were obtained from McGregor BFA’s monthly price data. Average monthly 
price data (rather than actual data on the announcement date) was used for the same reasons 
depicted in 4.3.2.1. EPS was calculated based on McGregor BFA’s monthly price data, in 
which PE and the close market price per share was given. Annual EPS growth was based on 
the historical 36 month EPS growth. 
 
4.3.2.4 Excess returns 
Excess returns are analysed based on the assumption that due to information asymmetry, 
management are better able to estimate future excess returns than the market (Bhana, 2007). 
The return one year after the issue (repurchase) announcement date was compared to the 
required return on announcement date in order to ascertain the existence of excess returns. 
The required return on announcement date was based on the CAPM. 
 
By viewing excess returns as the difference between the actual returns in a future period after 
the event and the required returns at the time of the event, it is assumed that management are 
able to predict returns in advance and could expect returns to be above or below market 
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expectations. If this is the case, the assumption is that they will try to capitalise on this 
difference in expectations. 
 
Share prices were obtained from McGregor BFA’s monthly price data in order to calculate 
actual returns. Average monthly close prices (rather than actual close prices on the 
announcement date) were used for the same reasons depicted in 4.3.2.1.  
 
In the calculation of required return using CAPM, the average yield on all government bonds 
with a maturity period of 0 to 3 years, that were traded on the stock exchange during the 
declaration year, was used as proxy for the risk free rate; in line with standard practice in the 
South African market, an equity risk premium of 6% was used; betas were calculated by 
regressing the 36 monthly share price returns against the three year monthly JSE All Share 
returns. All calculations were performed for the month in which the respective announcement 
occurred. 
 
4.3.3 Analysis of the mispricing metrics 
For equity market timing to exist, shares must be overvalued on the issue announcement date 
or undervalued on the repurchase announcement date. It is expected that the identification of 
the mispricing happens more than 3 months before the announcement. The assumption is that 
management uses this period to identify the exact level of mispricing and the best tool to 
signal the mispricing to the market. However, on announcement date the mispricing would 
not have been corrected and hence this study identifies the mispricing on the announcement 
date. 
 
In order to ascertain whether the shares were over or undervalued on announcement date, the 
MTB value of shares and PE ratios were recorded in the month of the issue (repurchase) 
announcements. In addition, Re was calculated one year after the issue (repurchase) 
announcement. Thereafter, the average MTB value of shares and PE ratios were examined for 
a period of three years prior to each share issue (repurchase) announcement date. The 
required return was also calculated on the issue (repurchase) announcement date. The MTB 
value and PE, as calculated on the announcement date of issue (repurchase) was compared to 
the historical three year average. Excess returns were calculated by subtracting the Ke on 
announcement date from the Re one year after.  
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A retrospective prediction of whether a share issue (repurchase) should have occurred based 
on this comparison, was made as follows: 
 
Table 3: Expected outcomes of share mispricing 
Metric Indication of mispricing* Share trading value(t) * Prediction 
MTB MTB(t) less 3 year average > 0 Overvalued Share issue 
MTB MTB(t)  less 3 year average < 0 Undervalued Share repurchase 
PE PE(t)  less 3 year average > 0 Overvalued Share issue 
PE PE(t)  less 3 year average < 0 Undervalued Share repurchase 
Excess return Re(t+1) less Ke(t) < 0 Overvalued Share issue 
Excess return Re(t+1) less Ke(t) > 0 Undervalued Share repurchase 
*t equals the year of the share issue (repurchase) announcement 
 
4.3.4 Determining the control variables 
The following metrics were used to capture the potential reasons, other than equity market 
timing, for share issues and repurchases:  
 
Table 4: Possible reasons for share issues 
Potential reason for share issue Fundamental metric representing reason 
Enhance/ maintain financial flexibility Total debt / capital 
Maintain target capital structure Total debt / total capital 
Raise finance for new projects Cash flow from investment activities / cash flow from 
operating activities 
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Table 5: Possible reasons for share repurchases 
Potential reason for share repurchase Fundamental metric representing reason 
Avoid hostile take-over Interest / net profit, PEG, MTB 
Maintain target capital structure Total debt / capital 
Return excess cash to shareholders Positive cash balance / total assets 
Substitution for cash dividends Dividend per share / earnings per share 
Dilution of EPS due to employee stock 
options 
Issue of additional employee shares within 12 
months preceding announcement 
 
4.3.4.1 Total debt / capital 
In order for companies to have access to finance, they would have to consider their credit 
ratings since many large financial institutions are prevented, by law, from investing in non-
investment grade companies (Kisgen, 2006). It is therefore appropriate to make use of a 
metric that rating agencies would use to represent the need to enhance or maintain financial 
flexibility. The total debt to capital ratio has been identified as one of the credit ratios used by 
Standard and Poors (S&P) in order to assign a credit rating to companies (Gunter & Vazza, 
2012). 
 
The total debt to capital ratio was also used to represent the potential reason of maintaining a 
target capital structure. Initially, the suitable ratio identified to capture this potential reason 
was debt to equity, however due to multicollinearity with other variables in the model; this 
ratio was replaced by total debt to capital. Details of the total debt and capital calculations are 
presented in Appendix B. 
 
4.3.4.2 Cash flow from investment activities / cash flow from operating activities 
An analysis of cash flow from investment activities to cash flow from operating activities is 
used in order to assess whether companies issued shares to raise funds for a new project or 
investment. An increase in this ratio in the year following the issue announcement could be 
an indication that shares were issued in order to raise finance for investment opportunities, at 
least in the short term. The financial line items used to calculate cash flow from investment 
activities and cash flow from operating activities are presented in Appendix B. 
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4.3.4.3 Debt/capital, MTB, PEG 
In order to assess whether share repurchases were conducted in an attempt to avoid a hostile 
takeover, the debt to capital, MTB and PEG ratios, as at announcement date, were captured as 
an interaction term in the regression analysis.  
 
A matrix analysis conducted by Cohen (2008) attempted to identify the top takeover targets 
in South Africa. Having made use of the criteria that PEG exceed 0.35 without exceeding 
0.75 and interest cover exceed 3 times, a list of ten companies subject to a takeover bid was 
published. To further refine this list to account for investors’ need for cheap investments, 
Cohen then excluded all companies not trading at a discount to NAV. Just short of six years 
later, an investigation into these identified companies found that 6 out of the 10 were 
involved in some form of merger/ takeover/ ownership restructure activity in the period 
following the publishing of Cohen’s article. For this reason, the same basis used by Cohen to 
identify potential takeover targets was used for the purposes of this study.  The only two 
differences are that firstly, this study uses debt to capital, instead of interest cover. This was 
done since debt to capital is viewed as a more reliable measure of gearing in the South 
African context, given the volatility of interest rates during the period under review. 
Secondly, Cohen calculated PEG by dividing PE by the five year aggregate prospective 
growth; while this study has calculated PEG by dividing PE by the three year annual 
historical earnings growth. In essence, the differing growth grates used between the two 
should not significantly alter the results, since the five year prospective growth would have 
had to be based, at least to some degree, on the historical growth rates.  
 
4.3.4.4 Cash / total assets 
An appropriate metric to use to assess whether companies repurchase shares because they 
have excess cash, would be the company’s favourable cash balances to total assets. The 
assumption is that if this ratio was significantly higher on the announcement date than 
historically, management have decided not to use the cash to fund additional projects and 
thus have excess cash available for distribution to shareholders. 
 
4.3.4.5 Dividend per share / earnings per share 
In order to assess whether share repurchases were used as a substitute for dividends, the 
dividend payout ratio was analysed. The assumption is that if this ratio was significantly 
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higher on announcement date than historically, management’s motivation for the repurchase 
could have been a substitution of dividends. 
 
4.3.4.6 Employee stock options 
An assessment of employee shares issued could provide an indication of whether share 
repurchases have been used in an attempt to reverse the negative dilutive effect of employee 
stock options on EPS. Bens, Nagar, Skinner & Wong. (2003) concluded that share 
repurchases increase when the dilutive effective of outstanding share options on diluted EPS 
increases.  
 
4.3.5 Analysis of the control variables 
Control variables were introduced in the final probit model, in order to establish whether the 
share issues (repurchases) announcements were made for reasons other than equity market 
timing. The table below explains the relevant calculations applied for each control variable 
which represents potential other reasons for the issue (repurchase) announcements. 
 
Table 8: Definition of control variables 
Other potential reason 
for announcement 
Control variable Method of calculation * 
Financial flexibility Total debt / capital (Total debt / capital)(t) – 3 yr historical average  
Target capital structure Total debt / capital (Total debt / capital)
 (t) – 3 yr historical average  
Investment in new project Cash flow from investment activities  
/ cash flow from operating activities 
(Cash flow from investment activities  
/ cash flow from operating activities)( t+1) – 3 yr 
historical average 
Hostile takeover threat MTB, Debt/capital, PEG Values for each variable brought into regression as 
interaction term 
Excess cash Total cash asset / total assets (Total cash asset / total assets)
 (t) – 3 yr historical 
average 
Substitution of dividends Dividends / earnings (Total dividends / total earnings)(t) – 3 yr historical 
average 
EPS dilution due to 
employee stock options 
No of employee shares issued Employee shares issued(t) – employee shares 
issued (t-1) 
*Where t represents the year of the announcement 
  
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4.3.6 Research Hypothesis 1: Share issues are not related to market timing 
If shares are found to be overvalued, management would be able to benefit from this 
overvaluation by issuing shares and thus earning excess returns (at least in the short term) 
from these share issues. Similarly if share issues are not related to market timing, the 
overvaluation of the shares would be irrelevant in management’s decision to issue shares. 
 
4.3.7 Research Hypothesis 2: Share repurchases are not related to market timing 
If shares are found to be undervalued, management would be able to benefit from this 
undervaluation by repurchasing shares at cheaper than market prices. Management would 
essentially receive a discount on the share repurchase, thus saving the company money. If 
share repurchases are however not related to market timing, the undervaluation of shares 
would be irrelevant in management’s decision to repurchase shares. 
  
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4.4 Regression Analysis 
4.4.1 Methodology 
Multivariable probit regression analysis is used, as the dependent variable in this study is 
categorical. The regression aims to determine the relationship between the actual 
announcements and the mispricing metrics. Theprobit model predicts the probability of an 
event (i.e. issue or repurchase) happening and the significance of the contribution of each 
factor to the probability. 
 
Initially PEG was included as an independent mispricing variable, but was removed due to 
high multicollinearity between PEG and the other variables in the study. 
 
The probit regression analysis controls for each of the other potential reasons for share issues 
(repurchases) by incorporating the fundamental metrics that best capture these reasons (tabled 
in 4.3.4 above). Together with the valuation metrics used to ascertain mispricing, these 
fundamental metrics form the independent variables in the probit regression analysis. 
 
The dependent variables in the probit regression analysis are the indicator variables that 
represent whether share issues or repurchase announcements have been made. The indicator 
variables for the actual announcements are represented as follows: 
 
Table 9: Indicator variables 
Event Indicator variable 
Share issue +1 
Share repurchase   0 
 
Each share issue (repurchase) announcement is seen as one event in which the calculations 
for the mispricing metrics and control variables are regressed. Inclusion of the control 
variables ensures that the impact of other potential reasons for share issues (repurchases) are 
captured, and so do not lead to misrepresentation of the relationship between mispricing and 
management’s strategy. 
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4.4.2 Robustness 
Heteroskedasticity exists when the variance of the error terms are different across 
observations. This study tested for heteroskedasticity using the heteroskedastic probit model. 
The individual independent variables were used as the control for heteroskedasticity.  

4.4.3 Internal validity 
A study is said to have higher internal validity when there is greater control exercised over 
the various independent variables (Ryan, Scapens, & Theobald, 2002). This study has 
ensured that internal validity was achieved as the regression has controlled for various other 
potential reasons for share issues (repurchases). The interpretation of the results of these 
reasons serves as stronger evidence of the existence or lack of causality between 
management’s announcements of issuing (repurchasing) shares and equity market timing. 
 
Coefficient of correlation was used in an attempt to test for multicollinearity. While it is 
understood that multicollinearity is an econometric problem that cannot definitively be tested 
for using correlation, this study has made use of coefficient of correlation as a potential (not 
definite) indication of multicollinearity. Due to the possible existence of multicollinearity, 
factor analysis was used to identify the key factors that explain most of the variation across 
all variables. Coefficient of correlation in conjunction with factor analysis resulted in the 
revision of the independent variables. Results are detailed in section 5.1.1 of this paper. 
 
Despite the fact that all share issue and repurchase announcements, for which there was 
information available, was included irrespective of whether the said companies were active or 
delisted, it should be noted that the results of this study should be interpreted with caution as 
there may be slight survivorship bias. This is due to the fact that this research relies on 
calculating excess returns using actual returns twelve months after announcement date, thus 
for companies that have delisted within twelve months after the announcement date, the said 
announcements were ignored. It should be noted that only the affected events are ignored, 
and not all the events of the affected company. 
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4.4.4 Reliability 
Reliability refers to the extent to which the study can be replicated in other settings 
(University of Southern California, 2013). This study can be said to be reliable due to the 
objective research method that was applied in this study. 
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
5.1 Variable definitions 
The variables used in the probit regression are explained in Appendix C. 
 
5.1.1 Coefficient of correlation 
Coefficient of correlation was used to test for multicollinearity. Results are shown in the 
correlation matrix in Appendix D. 
 
All independent variables, measured at the time of the announcement as well as the 
difference between the announcement date values and historical averages where applicable, 
were included in the test. At a 1% significance level, there is significant multicollinearity 
among most of the variables used in this study. The debt to equity ratio was removed since 
the relationship with MTB and debt/equity were positively moderate at r values above 0.40. 
The debt/equity ratio would initially have controlled for the potential reason of maintaining a 
target capital structure as the rationale for the share issue or repurchase. The elimination of 
the debt/equity ratio has thus resulted in the inclusion of variables that, although significant at 
a 1% level, depict weak correlations with r values not exceeding 0.20. The shaded cells in 
Table 11 of Appendix D depict the variables that are utilised in this study, along with their 
respective correlation coefficients. 
 
5.1.2 Factor analysis 
Due to the detection of multicollinearity and the fact that no stepwise regression exists for 
probit regression, factor analysis was used to identify the key factors that explain most of the 
variation across all variables.  
 
Factor analysis results displayed in Appendix E reveal that the following variables (shown in 
Table 13), ordered from most significant to least significant, should be included in the study. 
Appendix E also graphically displays the Eigenvalues, confirming that all factors have 
Eigenvalues greater than 1 (and are thus significant). Note that only the variables applicable 
to this study have been considered in the below results. 
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Table 13: Significant factors as per factor analysis 
Significant factors 
MTB(t) less historical average  
PE(t) less historical average 
DPS/EPS(t) less historical average 
Cash from investments/Cash from operations(t+1) less historical average 
Total Cash/total assets(t)  less historical average 
Debt/capital(t) less historical average 
Number of employee share options 
 
The lack of importance of PEG in the factor analysis has resulted in the removal of PEG from 
the independent variables. Although factor analysis did not suggest the inclusion of excess 
returns as a variable, this variable is included in the study since excess returns are closely 
linked to the accepted market signally theory (Bhana, 2007). 
 
 
5.1.3 Portfolio analysis 
After removing outliers from the data, all sample events used in the study were divided into 
ten portfolios based on MTB. The same was done using the PE ratios. The number of events 
in each portfolio was counted and compared to the probit regression results. Details of the 
portfolios are depicted in Appendix F. 
 
It should be noted that this analysis is a crude one, not having controlled for any other 
potential reasons for issues (repurchases) and utilising data that has not been controlled for 
heteroskedasticity and multicollinearity. The analysis should thus only be used for 
comparative purposes to the actual, more reliable, probit regression results.  
 
For both the MTB and PE portfolios, the expectation is that if management engaged in equity 
timing, most of the observations would be closer to Portfolio 1 or Portfolio 10, which are the 
portfolios representing extremely mispriced companies.  
 
Based on the analysis of these portfolios alone, there is very weak evidence of equity market 
timing since share issues (repurchases) mainly occur in Portfolios 5 and 6; where portfolios 
closer to the centre are correctly priced. The results of the portfolio analysis does not support 
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the findings of the regression analysis; which indicate a possibility of equity market timing on 
the JSE, based on excess returns. 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Regression 
5.2.1 Regression definitions 
 
The probit regression formula is written as 
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Where 
= probability of Y=1 or 0 for a chosen variable while all other Xi’s are held 
constant 
  	probability under a normal standard distribution curve 
X1 = difference between MTB ratio above average MTB (mtbvsavg) 
 X2 = difference between PE ratio above average PE (Pe) 
X3 = excess returns (Exreturns) 
X4 = difference between cash from investments and operating activities ratios above 
the average ratios (cficfotvsavg) 
X5 = difference between debt to capital above average debt to capital (debt_capit~g) 
X6 = difference between cash to assets above average cash to assets (cash_tasse~g) 
X7 = difference between dividends to earnings above average dividends to earnings   
…….(dps_epstvs~g) 
X8 = number of employee shares issued (esopt) 
X9 = interaction term of MTB, debt to capital and PEG 
……(c.mtbvsavg#c.debt_capitg#cpeg) 
ε = error term 
 βi = coefficients to be determined 
 
Where the independent variables of the model are defined in more detail as follows: 
 
Table 16: Regression definition of independent variables 
Independent variable Independent variable description Method of calculation * 
Mtbvsavg MTB MTB(t) less 3yr average 
Pe PE PE(t) less 3yr average 
Exreturns Excess Returns Re(t+1) less Ke(t) 
Cficfotvsavg Cash flow from investment activities  
/ cash flow from operating activities 
(Cash flow from investment activities  
/ cash flow from operating activities)( t+1) 
less 3yr historical average 
debt_capit~g Total debt / capital (Total debt / capital)(t) less 3yr historical 
average  
cash_tasse~g Total cash assets/ total assets (Total cash asset / total assets)(t) – less 3yr 
historical average 
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dps_epstvs~g Dividends / earnings (Total dividends / total earnings)(t) less 3yr 
historical average  
Esopt No of employee shares issued Employee shares issued(t) less employee 
shares issued(t-1) 
c.mtbvsavg#c.debt_capitg# 
c.peg 
Interaction term of MTB, total debt / 
capital, PEG 
N/A 
*Where t represents the year of the announcement 
 
5.2.2 Heteroskedastic probit regression 
To eliminate possible heteroskedasticity, this research makes use of the heteroskedastic probit 
model, because the existence of heteroskedasticity in probit models would lead to 
inconsistent results (Soderbom, 2009). With the heteroskedastic probit model, a generalised 
probit model is estimated. Eight heteroskedastic probit models were run, in which the eight 
regression ratios were each tested separately for heteroskedasticity. The eight tables are 
presented in Appendix G, where it is evidenced that when tested individually, excess returns, 
cash assets/total assets and dividends/earnings each influence heteroskedasticity. 
Convergence was not achieved when MTB was tested for heteroskedasticity, but this was not 
a problem in the research as the model ultimately used for this study has been verified as one 
that does not contain heteroskedasticity. 
It was necessary to re-specify the model by including the squares of the three variables 
identified as contributors to heteroskedasticity. Since the conditions of heteroskedasticity can 
change when new variables are added to the model, the heteroskedastic probit model was re-
run after inclusion of the three additional variables. Table 25 shows the results of the retested 
model. 
  
41 

Table 25: Heteroskedastic probit model – retested 
 
 
 
It is evident from Table 25 that the results of this model cannot be relied upon, since 
convergence was not achieved. It was thus necessary to remove the cash assets/total assets 
variable from the Insigma2 test. 
 
Table 26 presented below, indicates that the control for excess returns and dividends/earnings 
was sufficient to remove the problem of heteroskedasticity, with Prob > chi2 of the likelihood 
test being greater than 0.1. Results reveal a quadratic relationship between the variables and 
the model. Furthermore, there is overwhelming evidence based on a p-value equal to zero, 
that the model is suitable for the data. 
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Table 26: Heteroskedastic probit model – final 

 
The final regression formula is written as 
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Where 
= probability of Y=1 or 0 for a chosen variable while all other Xi’s are held 
constant 
  	probability under a normal standard distribution curve 
X1 = difference between MTB ratio above average MTB (mtbvsavg) 
 X2 = difference between PE ratio above average PE (Pe) 
X3 = excess returns (Exreturns) 
X4 = difference between cash from investments and operating activities ratios above 
the average ratios (cficfotvsavg) 
X5 = difference between debt to capital above average debt to capital (debt_capit~g) 
X6 = difference between cash to assets above average cash to assets (cash_tasse~g) 
X7 = difference between dividends to earnings above average dividends to earnings   
…….(dps_epstvs~g) 
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X8 = number of employee shares issued (esopt) 
X9 = interaction term of MTB, debt to capital and PEG 
……(c.mtbvsavg#c.debt_capitg#cpeg) 
X10 = square of excess returns (sq_exreturns) 
X11 = square of the difference between dividends to earnings above average dividends 
to earnings (sq_dps_eps~g) 
X12 = square of the difference between cash to assets above average cash to assets 
……...(sq_cash_ta~g) 
ε = error term 
 βi = coefficients to be determined 
 
Table 27 contains the variables which are significant when share issues (repurchases) are 
made. More detailed analysis is conducted in section 5.2.3 of this paper. 
Table 27: Significant variables in share issues (repurchases)
Variable Reason represented 
Excess returns Share mispricing 
Total debt / capital Target capital structure 
Financial flexibility 
Cash flow from investment activities/ cash flow from operating activities Investment in new project 
Total cash assets / total assets Excess cash 
 
Since only one mispricing metric is identified as significant, versus three of the control 
variables, it can be concluded that while there is a strong case for equity market timing on the 
JSE, one cannot ignore the fact that there are other significant reasons for engaging in share 
issues and repurchases. 
In order to ascertain whether share issues are sensitive to different factors than share 
repurchases, the final heteroskedastic probit model was re-run; but the indicator variables 
were swapped around (i.e. share issues were coded as 0 and share repurchases coded as +1). 
Table 30 in Appendix I confirms that when the coding is swapped around, results remain 
consistent with the initial model. The same variables are significant. The conclusion is thus 
that share issues are not sensitive to different factors than share repurchases. 
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As can be seen in Table 27, only one of the four mispricing metrics initially identified, is 
significant in this study. Surprisingly, MTB as a mispricing metric, does not appear to be as 
heavily relied upon in South Africa, as is the case in other markets. While MTB was used in 
numerous studies to investigate market timing historically (Baker & Wurgler, 2002; Butler, et 
al., 2011; Hovakimian, 2006), it is advisable to use excess returns in the South African 
context instead, since evidence suggests excess returns are relied upon by management in the 
issue (repurchase) decision. This result is consistent with Bhana’s (2007) study which found 
that market timing exists for South African companies engaging in share repurchases. The 
author found that companies repurchase shares when the shares are undervalued and 
determined whether shares are undervalued by investigating abnormal returns. Furthermore, 
the fact that the PE ratio is not significant, suggests that unlike the 70% of CFOs identified in 
Graham and Harvey’s (2002) survey, perhaps South African CFOs are not as fixated on EPS 
dilution as an important factor in their decision to issue equity. 
The fact that total debt to capital is a significant factor suggests that South African firms look 
to optimise their capital structure through share issues and repurchases. The trade-off theory 
is thus more prominent amongst South African firms. This contradicts the evidence found by 
Mohohlo (2013), that South African firms follow a pecking order theory. 
At a glance, it is seen that share issues are made in order to raise finance for new projects. It 
is however explained in 5.2.3.2 of this paper, that because the probability of share issues is so 
low for every one unit change in the investigated ratios, these results cannot be used to 
strongly infer a link between share issues and the need to raise finance for new projects. 
Consistent with reasons noted by Bhana (2007), this study finds that share repurchase 
decisions are possibly made to return excess cash to shareholders. In addition, share 
repurchases do not appear to be a substitute for dividends, which is consistent with results 
found by Ramorwa (2011). Share repurchases further do not appear to be embarked upon to 
avoid hostile takeovers, neither to reverse the negative dilutive effect of employee stock 
options on EPS. 
 
5.2.3 Results interpretation – marginal effects 
When interpreting the results of probit regression models, the marginal effect of a unit change 
in the exploratory variable on the dependent variable cannot be determined by simply 
investigating the associated coefficient, since probit models are non-linear (Soderbom, 2009). 
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Table 28 contains results of the average marginal effects of the four significant variables for 
share repurchases. Appendix H contains the average marginal effects results for share issues, 
which is simply the inverse of the results contained in Table 28.  
Table 28: Average marginal effects – share repurchases 
 
5.2.3.1 Excess returns 
Based on Table 28, on average for every 1% increase in excess returns, the probability of a 
share repurchase increases by 29%. Conversely, for every 1% increase in excess returns, 
there is a 29% reduction in the probability of a share issue. This result implies the potential 
existence of managerial equity market timing, however the marginal effects, depicted in 
Figure 1 below, shows that it is not a linear relationship. When excess returns are between -2 
and 0 (an indication that the share might be overvalued), the probability of a share issue 
increases. When there are no excess returns, management are more likely to issue shares. 
When excess returns are expected, there is a strong move towards share repurchases. On 
average however, an increase in excess returns increases the probability of share repurchases. 
These results strongly suggest that management engage in equity market timing, based on 
their expectation of excess returns. 
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Figure 1: Probit conditional marginal effects of excess returns, depicting an extract of the range where 
there is deviation from the average. The dots represent the mean that give excess returns and the lines 
represent confidence intervals. 
 
5.2.3.2 Investment in new project 
On average, for every one unit increase in the cash flow from investment activities to cash 
flow from operating activities ratio in the year after the announcement, versus the 3 year 
historical average, the probability of a share issue increases by 0.01%. The expectation was 
that if the ratio in the year after announcement was higher than the historic average; that 
shares were issued in order to raise finance to fund new projects. These results support this 
expectation, however because the probability of share issues is so low, these results cannot be 
used to strongly infer a link between share issues and the need to raise finance for new 
projects. Figure 2 shows an extract of the results, highlighting the non-linear relationship of 
the data. When the 3 year average of cash flow from investment activities to cash flow from 
operating activities, exceeds the ratio in the year after the announcement by between 1,000 
and 3,000 units, the likelihood of a share issue reduces. As soon as the historic average 
exceeds the ratio in the year after announcement, by up to 1,000 units, there is a move to 
issue shares. When the ratio in the year after the announcement then exceeds the 3 year 
historical average, the probability of a share issue increases. At a glance it appears that share 
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issues are made in order to raise finance for new projects in the short term; however the low 
probability associated with the results as well as the fact that the marginal effect depicts 
movements that aren’t significantly different to the mean, suggests that perhaps share issues 
are not predominantly linked to the need to raise finance for new projects; at least not in the 
short term. 
  
Figure 2: Conditional marginal effects of the cash flow from investment activities to cash flow from 
operating activities ratio in the year after the announcement, versus the 3 year historical average; 
depicting an extract of the range where there is deviation from the average.  
 
5.2.3.3 Capital structure and financial flexibility 
Table 28 suggests that on average, a change in the capital structure of a firm (relative to its 
historical structure) would increase (reduce) the probability of a share issue (repurchase) by 
50%. For every one unit that the debt to capital ratio in the year of announcement exceeds the 
3 year historical average, there is a 50% increase in the probability of a share issue. Figure 3, 
further indicates that this relationship is not linear. If, in the announcement year the debt to 
capital ratio is lower than the 3 year historical average, by between 0.5 and 3 units, the 
probability of a share repurchase increases. When the difference is lower than 0.5 units, there 
is a move toward issue shares. On average however, for every one unit that the debt to capital 
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ratio in the year of issue exceeds the 3 year historical average, the probability of a share issue 
increases by 50%. These results provide evidence that share issues are made in order to 
enhance financial flexibility since, when the ratio exceeds the historical average, the 
increased probability to issue shares implies that there may be an attempt to reduce the debt 
to capital ratio (favourable credit ratings are linked to low debt to capital ratios). Furthermore, 
the results strongly suggest that capital structure plays a significant role in share issue and 
repurchase decisions. 
 
Figure 3: Conditional marginal effects of the debt to capital ratio in the year of the announcement, versus 
the 3 year historical average; depicting an extract of the range where there is deviation from the average. 
The dots represent the difference between the debt to capital ratio on announcement date and the 
historical average; and the lines represent the confidence interval. 
 
5.2.3.4 Return excess cash to shareholders 
On average, when the positive cash balance to total assets increases by one unit when 
compared to the 3 year historical average, there is a 51% increase in the probability of a share 
repurchase. The expectation was if the ratio is higher on announcement date than the 
historical average, that excess cash exists and would be returned to shareholders via a share 
repurchase. This result therefore suggests that, on average, management repurchase shares in 
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order to return excess cash to shareholders. Figure 4 shows that when the ratio of positive 
cash to total assets is the same as the 3 year historical average (i.e. at point 0 on the x 
intercept), management are more likely to issue shares. When the ratio is up to 1.5 units 
lower than the 3 year historical average, the probability of a share issue increases. The 
moment that the cash balance to total assets increases above the 3 year historical average, the 
probability of a share repurchase increases. On average however, for every one unit that the 
positive cash balance to total assets on announcement date exceeds the historic average, the 
probability of a share repurchase increases by 51%. These results thus suggest that share 
repurchases are made in an attempt to return excess cash to shareholders. 
 

Figure 4: Conditional marginal effects of the positive cash to assets ratio in the year of the announcement, 
versus the 3 year historical average; depicting an extract of the range where there is deviation from the 
average. The dots represent the difference between the ratio on announcement date and the historical 
average. 
  
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5.3 Summary and conclusion 
In summary, for every 1% increase in excess returns, the probability of a share repurchase 
increases by 29%. Management thus appear to be better informed than the market and even 
attempt to benefit from the over and undervaluation of shares by embarking on share issues 
and repurchases. When share issues and repurchases are announced, the market now knows 
that management believe the company’s shares are overvalued / undervalued. MTB and PE 
ratios don’t appear to be relied upon by management as mispricing metrics when share issues 
(repurchases) are announced. At first glance, the other factors that appeared to be significant 
in the issue (repurchase) decisions are the need to invest in new projects, capital structure, the 
need for financial flexibility and the existence of excess cash. Upon further investigation, 
there is not strong enough evidence to suggest that share issues are made mainly in an attempt 
to raise finance for new projects in the short term. There is however evidence to suggest that 
share repurchases are made in attempt to return excess cash to shareholders; since an increase 
in excess cash is linked to an increased probability of share repurchases. Furthermore, there is 
evidence to suggest that share issues are made to enhance financial flexibility and issues 
(repurchases) decisions are strongly linked to capital structure deviations. Issues and 
repurchases are announced when the debt to capital ratios deviate from the historic average. 
 
All of the above lead to the conclusion that managerial equity market timing may exist in the 
presence of excess returns; where excess returns are viewed as the difference between the 
actual returns in a future period after the event and the required returns at the time of the 
event. With management better able to predict returns in advance than the market, they 
appear to attempt to capitalise on this difference in expectations. While evidence exists that 
share issues and repurchases are made because shares are over and undervalued, there is also 
evidence that suggests repurchases are made in attempt to return excess cash to shareholders. 
Furthermore, issues and repurchases are linked to the capital structure of firms involved. Due 
to the existence of other potential reasons for share issues and repurchases, the market must 
determine what the real intentions of management are when shares are issued and 
repurchased; and hence determine whether management’s intentions suggest equity market 
mispricing.   
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6. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
The results of this study are indirect results in that they were not derived from surveys or 
discussions with actual management. A more accurate result would be obtained if 
questionnaires are sent to management to capture what would influence their decision to issue 
or repurchase shares. The questionnaire would have to be issued to senior management who 
preferably have been part of the decision making-process involving an issue or a repurchase. 
Access to such individuals would be difficult and due to the time constraint on this report the 
more unobtrusive approach was adopted. 
Since this study has only focused on ascertaining the potential reasons for share issue 
(repurchase) announcements, a potential area for future research is the investigation of 
management’s behaviour when no share issues (repurchases) announcements are made. This 
would not only further explore managerial equity market timing, but could provide more 
conclusive evidence than the results of the current study. It should however be noted that in 
order to address this limitation, insider information may be required as management’s 
decision-making processes are not made public. 
 
Since this study has found that capital structure is strongly considered in share issues 
(repurchases), a potential area for further research would be to investigate the lasting effects 
of share issues (repurchases) on the capital structures of JSE firms. Reference to research 
techniques employed by Baker and Wurgler (2002) could be useful in this quest. 
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Appendix A 
 
A summary of the study’s sample is presented in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: Summary of sample 
  Announcements Companies 
Issues 295 102 
Repurchases 183 83 
Both issues and repurchases - (40) 
Total 478 145 

  
56 

Appendix B 
 
Total debt and capital were calculated by adding the following statement of financial position 
line items, as per the published financial statements extracted from McGregor BFA: 
 
Table 6: McGregor BFA line items for capital structure calculation 
 Year-end financial 
statements 
Interim financial 
statements 
 
 
 
Total debt 
Convertible Debentures  Long Term Liabilities 
Director's & Shareholders 
Loans 
Interest Bearing Short-Term 
Debt 
Long Term Non Interest 
Bearing 
Non-Interest Bearing Short-
Term Debt 
Long Term Interest Bearing  
Short-Term Interest Bearing  
Capital Total debt Total debt 
Total equity Total equity 

Cash flows from investment activities and operating activities have been calculated by adding 
the following cash flow statement line items, as per the published financial statements 
depicted on McGregor BFA: 
 
Table 7: McGregor BFA line items for calculation of cash flow movements 
 Year-end financial statements Interim financial statements 
Cash flow from investment 
activities 
Cash from Investment Activities Cash Flow from Investing 
Activities 
Cash flow from operating 
activities 
Cash from Operating Activities Cash Flow from Operating 
Activities 

 
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Appendix C 
 
Table 10: Probit regression variables 
Variable name 
in STATA 
Method of calculation * Control / mispricing variable represented 
cash_tasse~g (Total cash asset / total assets)(t) – 
3 yr historical average 
Total cash asset / total assets 
cashtotala~t (Total cash asset / total assets)(t) Total cash asset / total assets 
cficfot1 (Cash flow from investment activities / 
cash flow from operating activities)( t+1)  
Cash flow from investment activities / 
cash flow from operating activities 
cficfotvsavg (Cash flow from investment activities / 
cash flow from operating activities)( t+1) – 
 3 yr historical average
 
Cash flow from investment activities / 
cash flow from operating activities 
debt_capit~g (Total debt / capital)(t) – 3 yr historical average Total debt / capital 
debt_equit~g (Total debt / equity)(t) – 3 yr historical average Total debt / equity 
Debtcapitalt (Total debt / capital)(t) Total debt / capital 
Debtequityt (Total debt / equity)(t) Total debt / equity 
dps_epst (Dividends / earnings)(t) Dividends / earnings 
dps_epstvs~g (Total dividends / total earnings)(t) – 
3 yr historical average 
Dividends / earnings 
esopt No of employee shares issued Employee shares issued(t) – 
employee shares issued(t-1) 
exreturns Re(t+1) less Ke(t) Excess return 
mtb_4yravg MTB(t) less 4 year average MTB 
mtb_5yravg MTB(t) less 5 year average MTB 
mtbt MTB(t) MTB 
mtbtvsavg MTB(t) less 3 year average MTB 
pe PE(t) less 3 year average PE 
pe_4yr PE(t) less 4 year average PE 
pe_5yr PE(t) less 5 year average PE 
peg PE(t)/ 1 year annual EPS growth PEG 
pet PE(t) PE 
takeoverrisk MTB(t), debt / capital, PEG(t)** MTB, debt / capital, PEG 
*Where t represents the year of the announcement 
** Captured as an interaction term 
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Appendix D 
 
Table 11: Correlation matrix 
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Appendix E 
 
Table 12: Factor analysis 
 


Variable Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 Factor4 Factor5 Factor6 Factor7
cficfot1 -0.0011  -0.0224  0.0004    0.9493    -0.0087  -0.0662  0.0162    
cficfotvsavg 0.0083    -0.0720  -0.0121  0.9505    -0.0324  0.0428    -0.0440  
esop -0.0385  -0.0176  -0.0892  0.0146    -0.0284  0.0082    -0.8761  
debtcapitalt -0.0430  -0.1121  -0.0298  0.0453    -0.1523  0.7348    -0.0111  
debt_capit~g 0.2055    -0.0668  -0.0587  -0.2265  -0.2591  0.5543    -0.0350  
debtequityt -0.0925  -0.0537  -0.0180  -0.0245  0.0173    0.7368    -0.0281  
debt_equit~g 0.5922    -0.0084  -0.0215  -0.1392  -0.0312  0.1728    -0.0680  
cashtotala~t 0.0271    -0.1795  -0.0649  -0.0285  0.8158    -0.1598  -0.0157  
cash_tasse~g -0.0473  -0.2306  0.0025    -0.0518  0.8245    -0.0112  0.0575    
dps_epst 0.0218    0.1274    0.9442    -0.0188  -0.0151  -0.0042  0.1559    
dps_epstvs~g -0.0072  0.1404    0.9498    0.0075    0.0074    -0.0291  -0.0320  
mtbt -0.7429  -0.0028  -0.0071  -0.0219  0.0870    -0.1706  -0.0004  
mtbtvsavg 0.9629    0.0059    0.0044    0.0057    0.0141    0.0251    0.0145    
mtb_4yravg 0.9692    -0.0042  0.0074    0.0056    0.0084    -0.0398  0.0250    
mtb_5yravg 0.9074    -0.0063  0.0088    0.0098    0.0190    -0.1397  0.0369    
pet 0.0038    0.7729    0.2444    -0.0170  -0.0729  0.0781    0.0762    
pe -0.0064  0.8819    0.1020    -0.0286  -0.0909  -0.0242  -0.0023  
pe_4yr 0.0015    0.9295    0.0422    -0.0347  -0.0863  -0.0615  -0.0194  
pe_5yr -0.0031  0.9515    0.0738    -0.0434  -0.0940  -0.0444  -0.0070  
peg 0.0207    -0.3073  -0.0273  -0.0676  -0.0851  -0.4333  -0.0681  
exreturns 0.0764    0.0613    0.1842    0.0549    0.5360    0.0618    0.0517    
esopt 0.0231    -0.0083  0.0572    -0.0195  0.0182    -0.0161  0.8728    
Eigenvalue 3.6571  3.3901  1.9266  1.8949  1.7721  1.7078  1.5829  
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Eigenvalue
Factor
Eigenvalues of identified factors
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Table 14: Portfolio analysis of MTB mispricing metric 
  Start Range End Range Total events Share issues Share repurchases 
Portfolio 1                -63.67               -51.75                    1                  -                                1  
Portfolio 2                -51.74               -39.83                    1                    1                             -    
Portfolio 3                -39.82               -27.90                    2                    2                             -    
Portfolio 4                -27.89               -15.97                    9                    7                              2  
Portfolio 5                -15.96                 -0.09                217                151                            66  
Portfolio 6                       -                  11.92                216                106                           110  
Portfolio 7                 11.93                23.84                    9                    7                              2  
Portfolio 8                 23.85                35.77                    3                    3                             -    
Portfolio 9                 35.78                47.70                  -                    -                               -    
Portfolio 10                 47.71                55.50                    1                    1                             -    
 
 
Table 15: Portfolio analysis of PE mispricing metric 
  Start Range End Range Total events Share issues Share repurchases 
Portfolio 1              -172.43             -135.73                    2                    2                             -    
Portfolio 2              -135.72               -99.02                    4                    4                             -    
Portfolio 3                -99.01               -62.31                  11                  10                              1  
Portfolio 4                -62.30               -25.60                  27                  24                              3  
Portfolio 5                -25.59                 -                180                108                            72  
Portfolio 6                   0.01                36.70                199                  96                           103  
Portfolio 7                 36.71                73.41                    9                    8                              1  
Portfolio 8                 73.42              110.11                  17                  16                              1  
Portfolio 9               110.12              146.82                    8                    8                             -    
Portfolio 10               146.83              194.55                    2                    2                             -    
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Table 17: Exreturns as a contributor to heteroskedasticity 
 
 
Table 18: Cficfotvsavg as a contributor to heteroskedasticity 
 
Likelihood-ratio test of lnsigma2=0: chi2(1) =    30.29   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
   exreturns     .6554246   .2296352     2.85   0.004     .2053479    1.105501
lnsigma2      
                                                                              
       _cons     .2026767   .0739641     2.74   0.006     .0577097    .3476436
              
       c.peg    -.0179746    .092883    -0.19   0.847    -.2000219    .1640728
debt_capit~g# 
          c.  
 c.mtbtvsavg# 
              
       esopt    -6.83e-08   4.04e-08    -1.69   0.091    -1.48e-07    1.09e-08
          pe     .0000508   .0007029     0.07   0.942    -.0013269    .0014285
   mtbtvsavg    -.0129357   .0088499    -1.46   0.144    -.0302812    .0044097
dps_epstvs~g    -.0013004   .0010179    -1.28   0.201    -.0032954    .0006945
cash_tasse~g    -1.829819   .6312556    -2.90   0.004    -3.067057   -.5925806
debt_capit~g     1.127754   .4882426     2.31   0.021     .1708156    2.084691
cficfotvsavg     .0002192   .0001194     1.84   0.066    -.0000149    .0004533
   exreturns    -.6437278    .155593    -4.14   0.000    -.9486845    -.338771
issuerepur~e  
                                                                              
issuerepur~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -274.2733                      Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(9)        =      45.29
                                                Nonzero outcomes  =        295
                                                Zero outcomes     =        183
Heteroskedastic probit model                    Number of obs     =        478
> p nolog iterate(10000)
> epstvsavg mtbtvsavg pe esopt c.mtbtvsavg#c.debt_capitaltvsavg#c.peg, het(exreturns) noski
. hetprob issuerepurchase exreturns cficfotvsavg debt_capitaltvsavg cash_tassetstvsavg dps_
Likelihood-ratio test of lnsigma2=0: chi2(1) =    15.00   Prob > chi2 = 0.0001
                                                                              
cficfotvsavg     -.010856   .0195749    -0.55   0.579    -.0492221    .0275101
lnsigma2      
                                                                              
       _cons     .2497405    .065782     3.80   0.000     .1208101    .3786709
              
       c.peg     .0189985   .0895126     0.21   0.832     -.156443      .19444
debt_capit~g# 
          c.  
 c.mtbtvsavg# 
              
       esopt    -6.12e-08   3.60e-08    -1.70   0.089    -1.32e-07    9.43e-09
          pe     .0010845    .000955     1.14   0.256    -.0007872    .0029563
   mtbtvsavg    -.0021271   .0020144    -1.06   0.291    -.0060753    .0018211
dps_epstvs~g    -.0019187   .0011428    -1.68   0.093    -.0041586    .0003213
cash_tasse~g    -.7383664   .5289229    -1.40   0.163    -1.775036    .2983033
debt_capit~g     1.554633   .4680492     3.32   0.001     .6372736    2.471993
cficfotvsavg      .000012   .0000401     0.30   0.765    -.0000666    .0000906
   exreturns    -.2099203   .0947815    -2.21   0.027    -.3956886    -.024152
issuerepur~e  
                                                                              
issuerepur~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -281.9192                      Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(8)        =      43.74
                                                Nonzero outcomes  =        295
                                                Zero outcomes     =        183
Heteroskedastic probit model                    Number of obs     =        478
> skip nolog iterate(10000)
> epstvsavg mtbtvsavg pe esopt c.mtbtvsavg#c.debt_capitaltvsavg#c.peg, het(cficfotvsavg) no
. hetprob issuerepurchase exreturns cficfotvsavg debt_capitaltvsavg cash_tassetstvsavg dps_
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Table 19: Debt_capit~g as a contributor to heteroskedasticity 
 
 
Table 20: Cash_tasse~g as a contributor to heteroskedasticity 
 
  
Likelihood-ratio test of lnsigma2=0: chi2(1) =     1.17   Prob > chi2 = 0.2792
                                                                              
debt_capit~g    -.6203526   .6239286    -0.99   0.320     -1.84323    .6025251
lnsigma2      
                                                                              
       _cons     .2948427   .0648553     4.55   0.000     .1677286    .4219567
              
       c.peg    -.0000339   .0818483    -0.00   1.000    -.1604536    .1603858
debt_capit~g# 
          c.  
 c.mtbtvsavg# 
              
       esopt    -6.92e-08   3.27e-08    -2.12   0.034    -1.33e-07   -5.21e-09
          pe     .0002178   .0006938     0.31   0.754    -.0011419    .0015776
   mtbtvsavg    -.0029283    .002765    -1.06   0.290    -.0083477    .0024911
dps_epstvs~g    -.0013872   .0010028    -1.38   0.167    -.0033527    .0005784
cash_tasse~g    -.8520046   .5418936    -1.57   0.116    -1.914096    .2100873
debt_capit~g     1.402311   .5891051     2.38   0.017      .247686    2.556936
cficfotvsavg     .0003334   .0001406     2.37   0.018     .0000578     .000609
   exreturns    -.2824787   .0901953    -3.13   0.002    -.4592583   -.1056992
issuerepur~e  
                                                                              
issuerepur~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -288.8337                      Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(9)        =      43.42
                                                Nonzero outcomes  =        295
                                                Zero outcomes     =        183
Heteroskedastic probit model                    Number of obs     =        478
> vg) noskip nolog iterate(10000)
> epstvsavg mtbtvsavg pe esopt c.mtbtvsavg#c.debt_capitaltvsavg#c.peg, het(debt_capitaltvsa
. hetprob issuerepurchase exreturns cficfotvsavg debt_capitaltvsavg cash_tassetstvsavg dps_
Likelihood-ratio test of lnsigma2=0: chi2(1) =    24.83   Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
                                                                              
cash_tasse~g     2.668839   .7039474     3.79   0.000     1.289127     4.04855
lnsigma2      
                                                                              
       _cons     .2688867   .0655883     4.10   0.000      .140336    .3974374
              
       c.peg    -.0171358    .075022    -0.23   0.819    -.1641763    .1299048
debt_capit~g# 
          c.  
 c.mtbtvsavg# 
              
       esopt    -6.04e-08   3.39e-08    -1.78   0.075    -1.27e-07    6.16e-09
          pe     .0001205   .0006013     0.20   0.841     -.001058     .001299
   mtbtvsavg    -.0023662   .0018306    -1.29   0.196    -.0059541    .0012216
dps_epstvs~g    -.0010915   .0009382    -1.16   0.245    -.0029304    .0007474
cash_tasse~g    -1.026536   .4561757    -2.25   0.024    -1.920624    -.132448
debt_capit~g     1.714838   .4439317     3.86   0.000     .8447478    2.584928
cficfotvsavg     .0004706    .000155     3.04   0.002     .0001667    .0007744
   exreturns    -.5298379   .0970885    -5.46   0.000    -.7201279    -.339548
issuerepur~e  
                                                                              
issuerepur~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -277.0049                      Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(9)        =      71.31
                                                Nonzero outcomes  =        295
                                                Zero outcomes     =        183
Heteroskedastic probit model                    Number of obs     =        478
> vg) noskip nolog iterate(10000)
> epstvsavg mtbtvsavg pe esopt c.mtbtvsavg#c.debt_capitaltvsavg#c.peg, het(cash_tassetstvsa
. hetprob issuerepurchase exreturns cficfotvsavg debt_capitaltvsavg cash_tassetstvsavg dps_

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Table 21: Dps_epstvs~g as a contributor to heteroskedasticity 
 
 
Table 22: Mtbtvsavg as a contributor to heteroskedasticity 
 
  
Likelihood-ratio test of lnsigma2=0: chi2(1) =    10.49   Prob > chi2 = 0.0012
                                                                              
dps_epstvs~g     .0161336   .0058398     2.76   0.006     .0046879    .0275794
lnsigma2      
                                                                              
       _cons      .339986   .0602115     5.65   0.000     .2219737    .4579982
              
       c.peg     .0155234   .0818469     0.19   0.850    -.1448937    .1759404
debt_capit~g# 
          c.  
 c.mtbtvsavg# 
              
       esopt    -1.04e-07   3.62e-08    -2.87   0.004    -1.75e-07   -3.30e-08
          pe     .0005322   .0007117     0.75   0.455    -.0008626    .0019271
   mtbtvsavg    -.0022524   .0023985    -0.94   0.348    -.0069534    .0024486
dps_epstvs~g     .0001614   .0006669     0.24   0.809    -.0011457    .0014685
cash_tasse~g    -.4994164   .4075646    -1.23   0.220    -1.298228    .2993956
debt_capit~g     .9527042   .4441594     2.14   0.032     .0821677    1.823241
cficfotvsavg     .0003655   .0001346     2.72   0.007     .0001018    .0006292
   exreturns    -.2535814   .0802385    -3.16   0.002    -.4108461   -.0963168
issuerepur~e  
                                                                              
issuerepur~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -284.1751                      Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(9)        =      64.88
                                                Nonzero outcomes  =        295
                                                Zero outcomes     =        183
Heteroskedastic probit model                    Number of obs     =        478
> oskip nolog iterate(10000)
> epstvsavg mtbtvsavg pe esopt c.mtbtvsavg#c.debt_capitaltvsavg#c.peg, het(dps_epstvsavg) n
. hetprob issuerepurchase exreturns cficfotvsavg debt_capitaltvsavg cash_tassetstvsavg dps_
Likelihood-ratio test of lnsigma2=0: chi2(1) =    14.90   Prob > chi2 = 0.0001
Warning: convergence not achieved
                                                                              
   mtbtvsavg     .0200666   .0060764     3.30   0.001     .0081571    .0319761
lnsigma2      
                                                                              
       _cons     .3067423          .        .       .            .           .
              
       c.peg    -.0073441          .        .       .            .           .
debt_capit~g# 
          c.  
 c.mtbtvsavg# 
              
       esopt    -6.47e-08   3.36e-08    -1.92   0.054    -1.30e-07    1.18e-09
          pe     .0000797   .0006259     0.13   0.899    -.0011469    .0013064
   mtbtvsavg    -.0007591   .0000371   -20.48   0.000    -.0008317   -.0006864
dps_epstvs~g    -.0012624   .0009635    -1.31   0.190    -.0031508    .0006259
cash_tasse~g    -.8307635          .        .       .            .           .
debt_capit~g     1.718997          .        .       .            .           .
cficfotvsavg     .0004215   .0001395     3.02   0.003     .0001481     .000695
   exreturns    -.4094862   .1244916    -3.29   0.001    -.6534852   -.1654873
issuerepur~e  
                                                                              
issuerepur~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -281.9693                      Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(5)        =      64.84
                                                Nonzero outcomes  =        295
                                                Zero outcomes     =        183
Heteroskedastic probit model                    Number of obs     =        478
> p nolog iterate(10000)
> epstvsavg mtbtvsavg pe esopt c.mtbtvsavg#c.debt_capitaltvsavg#c.peg, het(mtbtvsavg) noski
. hetprob issuerepurchase exreturns cficfotvsavg debt_capitaltvsavg cash_tassetstvsavg dps_
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Table 23: PE as a contributor to heteroskedasticity 
 
 
Table 24: Esopt as a contributor to heteroskedasticity 
 
Likelihood-ratio test of lnsigma2=0: chi2(1) =     0.60   Prob > chi2 = 0.4392
                                                                              
          pe     .0043745   .0060433     0.72   0.469    -.0074703    .0162192
lnsigma2      
                                                                              
       _cons     .2937077   .0678839     4.33   0.000     .1606577    .4267578
              
       c.peg     .0005307   .0878249     0.01   0.995     -.171603    .1726643
debt_capit~g# 
          c.  
 c.mtbtvsavg# 
              
       esopt    -7.07e-08   3.46e-08    -2.05   0.041    -1.38e-07   -3.00e-09
          pe     .0000394   .0007606     0.05   0.959    -.0014514    .0015302
   mtbtvsavg    -.0024818   .0023521    -1.06   0.291    -.0070919    .0021283
dps_epstvs~g    -.0013199   .0009859    -1.34   0.181    -.0032523    .0006125
cash_tasse~g    -.3970653   .4828633    -0.82   0.411     -1.34346    .5493294
debt_capit~g     1.663516   .4904192     3.39   0.001     .7023123     2.62472
cficfotvsavg     .0003842   .0001411     2.72   0.006     .0001077    .0006607
   exreturns    -.2464329   .0922887    -2.67   0.008    -.4273154   -.0655504
issuerepur~e  
                                                                              
issuerepur~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood =   -289.12                      Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(9)        =      43.14
                                                Nonzero outcomes  =        295
                                                Zero outcomes     =        183
Heteroskedastic probit model                    Number of obs     =        478
>  iterate(16000)
> epstvsavg mtbtvsavg pe esopt c.mtbtvsavg#c.debt_capitaltvsavg#c.peg, het(pe) noskip nolog
. hetprob issuerepurchase exreturns cficfotvsavg debt_capitaltvsavg cash_tassetstvsavg dps_
. 
Likelihood-ratio test of lnsigma2=0: chi2(1) =     6.94   Prob > chi2 = 0.0084
                                                                              
       esopt     2.28e-07   1.60e-07     1.42   0.155    -8.64e-08    5.41e-07
lnsigma2      
                                                                              
       _cons      .341529   .0651539     5.24   0.000     .2138297    .4692284
              
       c.peg     .0050227   .0889862     0.06   0.955     -.169387    .1794324
debt_capit~g# 
          c.  
 c.mtbtvsavg# 
              
       esopt    -3.59e-07   2.54e-07    -1.41   0.158    -8.57e-07    1.40e-07
          pe     .0004226   .0007152     0.59   0.555    -.0009792    .0018243
   mtbtvsavg    -.0022646   .0021504    -1.05   0.292    -.0064794    .0019501
dps_epstvs~g    -.0028241   .0014408    -1.96   0.050    -.0056481   -1.33e-07
cash_tasse~g    -.6928352   .5153243    -1.34   0.179    -1.702852    .3171819
debt_capit~g     1.690012   .4777478     3.54   0.000     .7536431     2.62638
cficfotvsavg     .0003911   .0001361     2.87   0.004     .0001244    .0006578
   exreturns    -.2470759   .0893579    -2.77   0.006    -.4222142   -.0719377
issuerepur~e  
                                                                              
issuerepur~e        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
Log likelihood = -285.9474                      Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                LR chi2(9)        =      52.23
                                                Nonzero outcomes  =        295
                                                Zero outcomes     =        183
Heteroskedastic probit model                    Number of obs     =        478
convergence not achieved
> log iterate(16000)
> epstvsavg mtbtvsavg pe esopt c.mtbtvsavg#c.debt_capitaltvsavg#c.peg, het(esopt) noskip no
. hetprob issuerepurchase exreturns cficfotvsavg debt_capitaltvsavg cash_tassetstvsavg dps_
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Appendix H 
 
Table 29: Average marginal effects – share issues 
 
  
                                                                              
cash_tasse~g    -.5077358   .2053733    -2.47   0.013    -.9102601   -.1052116
debt_capit~g     .5026949   .1477151     3.40   0.001     .2131787    .7922111
cficfotvsavg     .0001398   .0000457     3.06   0.002     .0000503    .0002293
   exreturns    -.2881783   .0437232    -6.59   0.000    -.3738741   -.2024824
                                                                              
                    dy/dx   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                          Delta-method
                                                                              
dy/dx w.r.t. : exreturns cficfotvsavg debt_capitaltvsavg cash_tassetstvsavg
Expression   : Pr(issuerepurchase==1), predict(outcome(1))
Model VCE    : OIM
Average marginal effects                          Number of obs   =        478
> ome(1))
. margins, dydx( cficfotvsavg debt_capitaltvsavg cash_tassetstvsavg exreturns) predict(outc
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Table 30: Heteroskedastic probit model – indicator variables swapped

 
Likelihood-ratio test of lnsigma2=0: chi2(2) =     0.73   Prob > chi2 = 0.6943
                                                                                                        
                         dps_epstvsavg     .0010966   .0013644     0.80   0.422    -.0015775    .0037708
                             exreturns     .1318327    .303133     0.43   0.664     -.462297    .7259623
lnsigma2                                
                                                                                                        
                                 _cons    -.1891487   .0775226    -2.44   0.015    -.3410903   -.0372071
                                        
c.mtbtvsavg#c.debt_capitaltvsavg#c.peg     .0215627   .0883288     0.24   0.807    -.1515586     .194684
                                        
                                 esopt     6.50e-08   4.04e-08     1.61   0.108    -1.43e-08    1.44e-07
                                    pe     -.000187   .0008198    -0.23   0.820    -.0017939    .0014198
                             mtbtvsavg     .0067199   .0092497     0.73   0.468    -.0114092    .0248491
                 sq_cash_tassetstvsavg    -1.722826    1.27042    -1.36   0.175    -4.212803     .767151
                    cash_tassetstvsavg     1.739832   .8088844     2.15   0.031     .1544479    3.325216
                    debt_capitaltvsavg      -1.4833   .4993816    -2.97   0.003     -2.46207   -.5045302
                          cficfotvsavg    -.0003821   .0001732    -2.21   0.027    -.0007216   -.0000427
                      sq_dps_epstvsavg     2.09e-06   3.40e-06     0.61   0.540    -4.58e-06    8.76e-06
                         dps_epstvsavg            0  (omitted)
                         dps_epstvsavg     .0012918   .0014688     0.88   0.379    -.0015871    .0041706
                             exreturns      .815432   .2017996     4.04   0.000      .419912    1.210952
                          sq_exreturns    -.3174499   .1625225    -1.95   0.051    -.6359882    .0010883
issrep2                                 
                                                                                                        
                               issrep2        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                                        
Log likelihood = -271.2861                      Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(12)     =      62.54
                                                Nonzero outcomes  =        183
                                                Zero outcomes     =        295
Heteroskedastic probit model                    Number of obs     =        478
